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Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental
Disability Law Jurisprudence
Michael L. Perlin, J.D. and Deborah A.
Dorfman, J.D.
This article examines the way that "sanist" attitudes
(attitudes driven by the same kind of irrational, unconscious and bias-driven stereotypes exhibited in racist and
sexist decisionmaking) lead to "pretextual" decisions (in
which dishonest testimony is either explicitly or implicitly
accepted) in mental disability law jurisprudence. In conjunction with these sanist ends, social science data is teleologically employed by legal decisionmakers, so that it is
privileged when it supports a conclusion that the fact-finder
wishes to reach but subordinated when it questions such
a conclusion. The article examines recent Supreme Court
cases in an effort to determine the extent of domination
of such sanist behavior, and concludes by offering several
prescriptions to scholars and policymakers so as to best
avoid sanism's pernicious power.

I. INTRODUCTION
Any investigation of the roots or sources of mental disability jurisprudence has to
factor in society's irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings with mentally
disabled individuals. 1 The entire legal system makes assumptions about mentally
disabled people-who they are, how they got that way, what makes them different,
What there is about them that lets us treat them differently, and whether their conditions are immutable. 2 These assumptions-that reflect our fears and apprehensions about mental disability, the mentally disabled, and the possibility that we may
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become mentally disabled 3-are often non-reflective, self-referential and purportedly "common sensical"; 4 they reflect further the pernicious effect of heuristic
reasoning and thinking (implicit cognitive devices used to simplify complex information processing tasks and which frequently lead to distorted and systematically
erroneous decisions). 5 The most important question of all-why do we feel the
way we do about these people?-is rarely asked. 6
These conflicts lead us to inquire about the extent to which social science data
does (or should) inform the development of mental disability law jurisprudence.
After all, if we agree that mentally disabled individuals can be treated differently
(because of their mental disability, or because of behavioral characteristics that flow
from that disability), it would appear logical that this difference in legal treatment
is-or should be-founded on some sort of empirical data base that confirms both
the existence and the causal role of such difference. Yet, we tend to ignore, subordinate
or trivialize behavioral research in this area, especially when acknowledging that
such research would be cognitively dissonant with our intuitive (albeit empirically
flawed) views. 7
One might optimistically expect, though, that this gloomy picture is now subject
to change. First, scholars such as John Monahan and Laurens Walker have constructed a jurisprudence of "social science in law," articulating coherent theories
about the role of social science data and research in the trial process and outlining
specific proposals for obtaining, evaluating and establishing the findings of such
research. 8 Second, ·a recent series of social and political developments (primarily,

3

See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defence"-Why Not? 72 YALE L. J. 853,
868-69 (1963); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous, L. REV. 63, 108 (1991) (on society's fears of mentally disabled persons), and id.
at 93 n .174 ("[W]hile race and sex are immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both.
Perhaps this illuminates the level of virulence we experience here") (emphasis in original). On the way
that public fears about the purported link between mental illness and dangerousness "drive the formal
laws and policies governing mental disability jurisprudence," see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and
Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511,511 (1992) .
• Richard Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988) (discussing "ordinary common sense" (OCS) . See also, Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. (1992), manuscript
at 28 n.69 ("My criticism here is not of true 'common sense,' but of self-referential pronouncements
made under the guise of being 'commonsensical,' a kind offaux common sense").
' Michael Saks & Robert Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81); Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957,966 n.46 (1990).
' But see Perlin, supra note 1; Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990).
1
See, generally J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L. J. 137 (1990).
8
See e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991) . Similarly illuminating are Gary Melton's and Michael Saks' insights
into "psychological jurisprudence" (the study of community and cultural norms through structures that
create or sustain social behavior consistent with values that promote human welfare). See, e.g., Gary
Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is, Too): Human Rights in Psychological Jurisprudence,
16 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 381 ( 1992); Gary Melton & Michael Saks, The Law as an Instrument ofSocialization
and Social Structure, in 33 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS ABEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT
235 (Gary B. Melton ed. 1985).
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the public awareness of psychiatric hospital deinstitutionalization and its purported
link to homelessness, and a series of sensational criminal trials in which mental
status defenses have been raised) have resulted in significantly increased visibility
of some mentally disabled persons in often-negative ways. 9 One might expect that
litigation and legislation in these areas would draw on social science data in attempting to answer such questions as, say, the actual impact that deinstitutionalization
has had on homelessness, or whether experts can knowledgeably testify about criminal
responsibility in so-called "volitional prong" insanity cases. 10
And yet, when we attempt to place mental disability law jurisprudence in context,
we are confronted with a discordant reality: social science is rarely a coherent
influence on mental disability law doctrine. 11 Rather, the legal system selectivelyteleologically-either accepts or rejects social science data depending on whether
or not the use of that data meets the a priori needs of the legal system. 12 In other
words, social science data is privileged when it supports the conclusion the fact
finder wishes to reach, but it is subordinated when it questions such a conclusion. 13
It is not enough to simply say, in an almost existential tone, that courts are teleological. What we must do next is to try to articulate exactly what ends fact finders
(both trial and appellate judges) attempt to meet through their manipulation of
social science data and social science reasoning.
We contend that these ends are sanist. By this we mean that decisionmaking
in mental disability law cases is inspired by (and reflects) the same kinds of irrational,
unconscious, bias-driven stereotypes and prejudices that are exhibited in racist, sexist,
homophobic and religiously- and ethnically-bigoted decisionmaking. 14 Sanist decisionmaking infects all branches of mental disability law, and distorts mental disability
jurisprudence. Paradoxically, while sanist decisions are frequently justified as being
therapeutically-based, sanism customarily results in anti-therapeutic outcomes. 15

9

Perlin, supra note 3, at 106-08; Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism, " 46 SMU L. REv. ·373, 399-400
(1992)_. On the ~ole of the media in the dissemination of information in such cases, see Thomas Grisso,
f.orens1c Evaluations an1 the Fourth Estate, 3 FORENS. REP. 427 (1990).
S ee, e.g. , Norman Fmkel, The Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Verdict S chemas, 15 LAW & HUM
BEHAV. 533, 535 (1991); Richard Rogers, APA 's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism Versus Emotio~
nalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 840 (1987).
11
See _e.g., Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight aruf Dark: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional
!nsamty Defe~e, 40 J:IASTINGS L. J. 1, ~0--5~ (1988); P~rlm, supra note 1, at 658 n.256 (federal legislators
ignored empmcal eVJdence about the msamty defense m the debate leading to the passage of the Insani
Defense Reform Act of 1984).
ty
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each aspect of the law's development. In Part V, we urge scholars to confront these
systemic dissonances as a means of creating a coherent framework for the use of
social science data in mental disability cases. Here we also show how this confrontation will help create a mental disability jurisprudence that is truly therapeutic.
Finally, we conclude with some recommendations for all participants in the mental
disability law system.

II. SANISM
A. lntroduction20
"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism,
sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry. 21 It infects both our jurisprudence and
our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.
It is based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization, and
is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS)
and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life
and in the legal process.
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E] mbedded in the cultural presuppositions
that engulf us all, " 22 they express discomfort with social science23 ( or any other
system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over society) and skepticism
about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism allows them to take deeper refuge
in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective OCS, both of which perpetuate the
myths and stereotypes of sanism. 24

B. Sanism and the Court Process in Mental Disability Law
Cases
Jud~~s re~ect and project the conventional morality of the community, and judicial
dec1s1ons m all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect

0

' ~uch of the material infra text accompanying notes 21-29 is adapted from Perlin, supra note 4
_
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Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy 32 WM & MARYL RE
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Perlin, supra note 6, at 61-69; Perlin, supra note l ; at 718-30.
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and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. 25 Their language demonstrates bias against mentally disabled individuals26 and contempt for the mental health professions. 27
Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in the legal process to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a popular sanist
myth is that "[m]entally disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They
give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate selfrestraint. '' 28
Rarely, if ever, is behavioral or scientific authority cited to support sanist opinions.29
As we will show, it is not coincidental that this sort of sanist judicial behavior
ignores available social science research. Through sanist thinking, judges allow themselves to avoid difficult choices in mental disability law cases; their refuge in alleged
"ordinary common sense" contributes further to the pretextuality that underlies
much of this area of the law.

III. SELECTIVE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA
The use of social science data is often met with tremendous resistance by the courts,
which are frequently skeptical and suspicious of and hostile toward such evidence.30
Specifically, the skepticism toward statistical data and evidence about the behavioral
sciences appears to stem directly from the belief that such data .are not "empirical"
in the same way that "true" sciences are and therefore are not trustworthy. 31 Social
science data is seen as overly subjective and vulnerable to researcher bias. 32
Courts are often threatened by the use of such data. Judges' general dislike of
See Perlin, supra note 9; at 400-04. Not all judicial opinions are sanist. See, e.g., id., at 403--04;
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 103--04 (citing examples). For more recent examples, see Riggins
v. Nevada, 112 S.C+.1810 (1992) (trial court's failure to determine need for continued administration
of antipsychotic medications to insanity-pleading defendant or to make inquiry about reasonable alternatives violated defendant's liberty interest in freedom from such drugs; conviction reversed); Foucha v.
Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (statute that permits continued hospitalization of insanity acquinee
·
found to be no longer mentally ill violates due process).
26
See, e.g., Com v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh. den ., 714 F .2d 159 (11th Cir.
1983), cert. den., 467 U .S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright,
814 F .2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir., 1987), quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974)
(using "lunatic") .
27
See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1983) (reversible error for trial
judge to refer to expert wimesses as "headshrinkers"). Compari State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 956
(Vt. 1986), app'l after remand, 595 A.2d 248 (Vt. 1990), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) (conviction
reversed where prosecutor referred to expert testimony as "psycho-babble"), to Commonwealth v. Cosme,
575 N .E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where prosecutor referred to defendant's expert wimesses
as "a little head specialist" and a "wizard").
28
Perlin, supra note 9, at 396.
29
See, e.g., People v. LaLone, 437 N .W.2d 611, 613 (Mich. 1989), reh. (1989) (without citation to
any authority, court found that it is less likely that medical patients will "fabricate descriptions of their
complaints" than will "psychological patients"); In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892,898 (D.C. 1991) (psychiatric
predictivity of future dangerousness likened to predictions made by an oncologist as to consequences
of an untreated and metastasized malignancy); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Wyo. 1987)
(expert testimony on a homicide defendant's reactions to fear and stress rejected on grounds that such
emotions are "experienced by all mankind" and thus not related to any body of scientific knowledge) .
30
Perlin, supra note 23, at 136-37; J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science:
A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N. C. L. REV. 7 41, 742-46 ( 1988).
31
See, e.g., David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law
as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1010 (1989).
32
Faigman, supra note 31, at 1016, 1026.
25
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social science is reflected in self-articulated claims that they are unable to understand
the data and are thus unable to apply it properly to a particular case. 33
This dislike and distrust of social science data has led courts to be teleological
in their use of this evidence. Social science that enables courts to meet predetermined
sanist ends is often privileged while data that would require judges to question such
ends are frequently rejected. 34 Judges often select certain proferred data that
adheres to their pre-existing social and political attitudes, and use both heuristic
reasoning and false OCS in rationalizing such decisions. 35 Social science data is
used pretextually in many cases to rationalize otherwise baseless judicial decis1.ons.36
Courts thus will take the literature out of context, 37 misconstrue the data or
evidence being offered,38 read such data selectively, 39 and/or inconsistently.40
Other times, courts choose to flatly reject41 this data or ignore its existence. 42
In other circumstances, courts simply "rewrite" factual records so as to avoid having
to deal with social science data that is cognitively dissonant with their OCS. 43
Even when courts do acknowledge the existence and possible validity of studies

33

See, e.g., Perlin, supra 'note 5, at 986- 93, discussing decision in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. den., 494 U .S. 1016 (1990) (limiting right of pretrial detainees
to refuse medication). The Charters court rejected as incredulous the possibility that a court could make
a meaningful distinction between competency to stand trial and competency to engage in medication
decisionmaking:
[Such a distinction] must certainly be of such sublety and complexity as to tax perception by the
most skilled medical or psychiatric professionals ... To suppose that it is a distinction that can be
fairly discerned and applied even by the most skilled judge on the basis of an adversarial fact-finding
proceedings taxes credulity.
fharters, 863 F.2d at 310.
• Perlin, supra note 23, at 136--37; Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 341; Tanford, supra note 7, at 144-50;
r,aigman, supra note 12, at 581.
On the courts' heuristic use of social science data, see Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 74-77. '
36
See Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 75-76, discussing decisions in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U .S.
880 (1983) (testimony as to future dangerousness admissible at penalty phase in capital punishment
c~se), McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting statistical evidence offered to show racial
~1Scrimination in death penalty prosecutions), and Charters, (curtailing rights of criminal defendant await-'
\?g ~al to refuse antipsychotic medication).
"' Fa1gman, supra note 12, at 577.
"Id. at 581.
Katheryn Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights. 52 ALB. L. REV. 405,461 (1988) (on courts'
reading of impact of parents' homosexuality in custody decisions); Tanford, supra note 7, at 153-54.
See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U .S. 560, 571 n.4 (1986) (defendant's right to fair trial not denied
Where uniformed state troopers sat in front of spectator section in courtroom; court rejected contrary
~mpirical
study, and based decision on its own "experience and common sense") .
0
• See, e.g., Thomas Hafemeister & Gary Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on the Judiciary,
REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH 27 (Gary B. Melton ed. 1987).
42 Se~, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897-902.
Faigman, supra note 12, at 581. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sanders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (refusal of courts
~? acknowledge social science research on ways that jurors evaluate and misevaluate eyewitness testimony) .
The classic example is Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the court in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
~OS-10 (1979) (approving more relaxed involuntary civil commitment procedures for juveniles than
adults). See, e.g., Gail Perry & Gary Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts:
arham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 645 (1984) :
The Parham case is an example of the Supreme Court's taking advantage of the free rein on social
facts to promulgate a dozen or so of its own by employing one tentacle of the judicial notice doctrine.
The Court's opinion is filled with social facts of questionable veracity, accompanied by the authority
to P~opel these facts into subsequent \:ase law and, therefore, a spiral of less than rational legal policy
making.

!?
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that take a contrary position from their decisions, this acknowledgement is frequently
little more than mere "lip service. " 44

IV. SANISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
Sanist attitudes toward social science permeate all aspects of the mental disability
trial process. Here, we consider specifically these attitudes in the contexts of involuntary civil commitment cases, cases involving the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, and in criminal trial determinations of incompetency to stand trial and the
insanity defense.

A. Involuntary Civil Commitment
In the involuntary civil commitment process, courts often selectively use social science
data in order to rationalize sanist decisions to either commit patients or deny their
petitions for release. Thus, while involuntary civil commitment cases ostensibly turn
on the question of whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient
is mentally ill and, as a result of that mental illness, is dangerous to herself or
others (or, in some jurisdictions, gravely disabled), other factors frequently dominate
the decisionmaking proc;:ess. Thus, an entirely different question-whether the
patient is likely to· self-medicate in the community45-is frequently the dispositive
"swing" issue in contested commitment cases.
In deciding such cases, courts will privilege psychiau-ic testimony that implicitly
suggests that forensic experts have the power to make this prediction in spite of
an utter absence of any behavioral evidence to support ei~er the premise that psychiatrists can accurately make this prediction, or whether there is any correlation between
this conclusion and future dangerousness. 46 This privileging serves overtly sanist
and pretextual ends; it allows courts to overcommit individuals who do not meet
statutory commitment criteria where judges feel "it's the right thing to do. " 47 This
puts a false patina of testimonial respectability on decisions.that are grounded neither
in social science nor in coherent legal doctrine.
44
S ee, e. g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1990) (prisoners retain limited liberty interest
in right to refuse forcible administration of antipsychotic medications), in which the majority acknowledges, and emphasizes in response to the dissent, the harmful, and perhaps fatal, side-effects of the
drugs. The court also stressed the "deference that is owed to medical professionals ... who possess
... the requisite knowledge and expertise to determine whether the drugs should be used." Id. at 230
n.12. Compare id. at 247-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (suggesting that the
majority's side effects acknowledgement is largely illusory). But compare Riggins v. Nevada, 112 U.S.
1810 (1992) discussed infra text accompanying notes 69-78.
Scholars who recommend a critical reevaluation of the way that that social. science data is received,
see, e.g., Monahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 582-83, are similarly frequently ignored. See infra Part
IV.
45
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 83-95; Michael L. Perlin, R eading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves:
Predicting Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENS.
PSYCHIATRY 37, 50-51 (1991).
46
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 88-89.
47
Michael Saks, Expert Wimesses, Nonexpert Wimesses, and Nonwimess Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
291,293 (19.9 0), discussing trial judge's explanation to mental health law students as to why he ordered
commitment in individual cases notwithstanding a failure of proof:
I guess you noticed that some of these people were not fit subjects for commitment under the
statute. But, after all, I am a human being. I care what is best for these people, and I have to
do what I think is right.

Development of mental disability law jurisprudence

55

Even where courts seek to determine whether statutorily-mandated dangerousness
criteria are met, dispositions inevitably turn on future dangerousness predictions,
in spite of an overwhelming data base questioning the accuracy of psychiatric predictions in -this area. 48 The paradox here is a pointed one: judges continue to cite
approvingly observations on the state of psychiatric knowledge more than 35 years
out of date 49 notwithstanding a broad array of recent and available research suggesting impressive improvement in psychiatric diagnosis and testing. 50 Yet, they doggedly endorse-and "routinely ·and unquestioningly accept[]" 51 -the continued
use of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, notwithstanding the empirical record
demonstrating the inaccuracy of most such predictions. The teleological use of this
paradox is demonstrated in In re Melton's comparison of an oncologist's ability to
predict the future prognosis of a cancer patient to a psychiatrist's ability to predict
future dangerousness. 52 Here, psychiatry was placed on an equal footing with general
medicine where such testimonial privileging served sanist ends.
Similarly, courts frequently teleologically ignore social science so as to justify conclusions that failure to involuntarily commit a person will lead causally to that person's future homelessness, 53 or to sustain commitments based upon legislation that
broadens the scope of committability to include individuals who are " gravely disabled" and thus deemed incapable of caring for themselves. 54
Sanist treatment of social science data is common even in cases that are generally
nonpretextual. Thus, in Zinermon v. Burch, 55 the Supreme Court recognized that
a patient's "voluntary" status is often illusory, and held that a patient could maintain
a civil rights suit alleging that he had a right to a due process hearing prior to

••, Barefoot, 463 U .S. at 916-19 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
9

See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1789 (1992) ·(O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983), quoting
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U .S. 366, 375 (1956), on the "present state of [psychiatric) knowledge
and therapy regarding mental disease"); id. at 1801 ('Ibomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones' further
quotation of Greenwood as to the "uncertainty of diagnosis ... and tentativeness of professional judg-·
ment"). See also Nesbitt v. Community of South Dade, Inc., 467 So. 2d 711, 717 (Fla. Dist. App.
1985) Oorgenson, J., dissenting), attacking the credibility of psychiatry and contrasting it to the validity
of other medical evidence:
The science of psychiatry represents the penultimate grey area .. . A substantial body of literature
suggests that the psychiatric field cannot even agree on approopriate diagnosis, much less recommend
a course of treatment. Unlike a physician's diagnosis, which can be verified by x-ray, surgery, etc.,
the psychiatrist cannot verify his diagnosis, treatment, or predicted prognosis except by long-term
follow-up and reporting.
.
50
See Perlin, supra note l, at 658-63 (citing developments) .
51
See Marilyn Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in Texas: Psychotherapists' Conflicting Duties, Their
;,0 tential Liability, and Possible Solutions, 12 ST. MARY'S L. J. 141, 150 n.71 (1980).
597 A.2d 892,898 (D.C . 1991) (upholding civil commitment).
53
See, e.g., In re Melton, 565 A.2d 635, 649 (D.C. 1989) (Schwalb, J., dissenting), superseded on rehearing,
~97 A.2d 788 (D.C. 1991), discussed in Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 107--08.
This category includes those unable to find and maintain housing, unable to feed themselves, or unable
to effectively self-medicate for both physical as well as mental problems. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.
§2 7-10-107 (1982); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §§10-617, 10-805 (f) (1982 & 1987 Supp'. ); see
also Mary Durham & John LaFond, The Impact of Expanding a State's Therapeutic Commitment Authority,
~EUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15, at 121. In deciding such cases, courts frequently link a
~ding of "gravely disabled" to future dangerousness in order to justify commitment. See, e.g., People
in the Interest of King, 795 P.2d 273 (Colo. App. 1990) (even though expert testimony indicated patient
Was not necessarily dangerous in supervised setting, evidence sustained finding of "dangerousness" so
~s to sustain long-term treatment petition).
494 U.S. 113 (1990) .
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his "voluntary" admission to a mental health facility. 56 Yet, in support of this
decision, Justice Blackmun noted that "the very nature of mental illness" makes
it "foreseeable" that such a person "will be unable to understand any proferred
'explanation and disclosure of the subject matters' of the forms that such a person
is asked to sign, and will be unable 'to make a knowing and willful decision' whether
57
to consent to admission. "
It is ironic that Zinermon-the first Supreme Court case to consider the multiple
textures of "voluntariness"-still retains the concept of a unitary definition of the
impact of mental illness on competency. Competency is not a "fixed state;" a person
competent for some legal purposes may be incompetent for others at the same time;
incompetency and mental illness are not identical states. 58 Although the ultimate
impact of Zinermon on actual practice is still not clear, 59 it shows that, even in
the context of a "generally sensitive" decision 60 by the member of the court with
the best understanding of psychological concepts and constructs, 61 social science
data is still misused in at least a partially sanist way.

B. The Right to Refuse Medication
The teleological use of social science data is also prevalent in decisions in cases
involving the right to refuse antipsychotic medication. 62 For the past 15 years,
this issue has dominated the legal-medical debate and has been seen as "the most
controversial issue in forensic psychiatry today. " 63 Advocates of the use of such

6
'
51

Id. at 130-37.
Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
58
See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum & Loren Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1465 (1981); Loren Roth, Alan Meisel & Charles Lidz, Tests of Competence to
Consent UJ Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 279 (1977). See also In re LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d
196, 728 P. 2d 138, 146 (1986) ("the mere fact that an individual is mentally ill does not mean that
the person so affected is incapable of making a rational choice with respect to his or her need for treatment").
59
Compare Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN TuERAPElITIC JURISPRUDENCE 83, 130 (David Wexler &
Bruce Winick eds. 1991) (lower courts should be "hesitant to read Zinermon's language broadly"), UJ
1 PERLIN, supra note 17, §3.69, at 60-61 (1991 pocket part) (speculating that, given the growing fear
of litigation by public mental hospital staff personnel, Zinermon may have a "further reductive effect
on state hospital admissions").
60
1 PERLIN, supra note 17, §3.69 at 60 (1991 pocket part).
61
See Gary B. Melton, Realism in Psychology and Humanism in Law: Psycholegal Studies at Nebraska,
69 NEB. L. REV. 251, 272-73 (1990) Gustice Blackmun is "Court's scientist" and "Court's moral
authority").
62
As with involuntary civil commitment decisions, social factors play a significant role in institutional
medication decisionmaking as well. See, e.g., Paul Benson, Factors Associated With Antipsychotic Drug
Prescribing by Southern Psychiatrists, 21 MED. CARE 639 (1983) (patients' race, occupation and marital
status found to be significant during process of prescribing antipsychotic medications); Ira Sommers
& Deborah Baskin, The Prescription of Psychiatric Medications in Prison: Psychiatric Versus Labeling Perspectives, 7 JUST. Q. 739 (1990) (decision to medicate mildly impaired prison inmates influenced by social
factors).
63
Michael L. Perlin, The Right to Refuse Treatment in a Criminal Law Setting, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:
A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (R. Rosner ed. 1992) (in press), manuscript at 1, quoting, in part, Jonathan
Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, and Rogers: The Burger Court and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4
J. LEG. MED. 323 (1983). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 17, Chapter 5; Michael L. Perlin, Decoding
Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY (1992) (in press).
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medication point to its benefits while critics point out the serious neurological side
effects that can result from these drugs. 64 As a result of this debate, the courts
have the opportunity to "choose sides;" thus, if they so choose, they can critically
assess the empirical data, or, they can demur to the evidence and refuse to engage
in a scholarly discourse over such data. 65
Such was the case in Washington v. Harper in which the Court answered the
question of whether a convicted prisoner could be forcibly medicated against his
will. In providing defendant with a limited remedy, the majority in Harper selectively
chose to privilege those aspects of the data available on the effects of antipsychotic
drugs that discussed the benefits of such medication, while at the same time acknowledging but discounting66 the potential harmful and debilitating effects of these
drugs.61
Harper thus accommodated social science evidence with an important strand of
the Supreme Court's penological jurisprudence: "prison security concerns will, virtually without exception, trump individual autonomy interests. " 68
The court's social science jurisprudence seemed to take a dramatic turn this term,
though, in Riggins v. Nevada. 69 Riggins held that the use of antipsychotic drugs
violated defendant's right to fair trial (at which he had raised the insanity defense),
citing Harper's side-effects language, and construing Harper to require "an overriding
iustification and a determination of medical appropriateness" prior to forcibly administering antipsychotic medications to a prisoner. 70 It focused on what might be
called the "litigational side-effects" of antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the possibility that the drug use might have "compromised" the substance of the defendant's
trial testimony, his interaction with counsel, and his comprehension of the trial. 71 .
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (the author of Harper) took an even
bolder position. He would not allow the use of antipsychotic medication to make
a defendant competent to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's
Pan, and noted further that he doubted this showing could be made "given our

64

The disagreement is seen most pointedly in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988)
}fn bane), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
•• See Perlin, supra note 5, at 991 (criticizing Charters).
See Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part):
The Court relies heavily on the brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington
State Psychiatric Association ... to discount the severity of these drugs. However, medical findings
discussed in other briefs support conclusions of the Washington Supreme Court and challenge the
reliability of the Psychiatrists' Brief.
0
mpare, e.g., id. at 230 (majority relies on Psychiatrists' brief for proposition that tardive dyskinesia
~s found in 10-25% of hospitalized patients), to id. at 239 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting
part) (chances greater than one in four of patient developing tardive dyskinesia, and rate is increasing).
In Harper, both the state and the defense submitted studies discussing drug side-effects. Although
both sets of studies acknowledged the side-effects' seriousness, they disagreed on how pervasive they
:ere in institutional populations. See id. at 229.
•• 2 PERLIN, supra note 17, §5.64A, at 64 (1991 pocket part).
112 S. Ct. 1810 ( 1992). Even though Riggins might appear to be more appropriately discussed as
a "criminal trial process" case, we have chosen to consider it here so as to illuminate its relationship
to Harper. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Riggins v. Nevada: Forced Medication Collides Wirh the Right
~ a Fair Trial, 16 NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. (Dec. 1992) (in press),
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
71
Id. at 1816.
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present understanding of the properties of these drugs." 72 Justice Thomas dissented,
suggesting (1) the administration of the drug might have increased the defendant's
cognitive ability, 73 (2) since Riggins had originally asked for medical assistance
(while a jail inmate, he had "had trouble sleeping" and was "hearing voices"),
it could not be said that the state ever "ordered" him to take medication, 74
(3) if Riggins had been aggrieved, his proper remedy was a §1983 civil rights action, 75
and (4) under the majority's language, a criminal conviction might be reversed
in cases involving "penicillin or aspirin. " 76
It is not clear whether Riggins is teleological. Riggins differs importantly from
Harper in that the court treated Harper as a prison security case while it read Riggins
as a fair trial case; yet, this difference in the litigants' legal status self-evidently has
no effect on the physiological or neurological potential impact of the drugs in question. Nevertheless, the side effects language in Harper (subordinated there because
of security reasons) is privileged in Riggins (where such issues are absent) by nature
of the court's consideration of the question in the context ofa fair trial issue. Thomas's
opinion raises grave issues for defense counsel; had his position prevailed, would
• concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they were assuming a risk in
ever seeking psychiatric help for an awaiting-trial defendant? His analogizing antipsychotic drug side effects to penicillin or aspirin may be disingenuous or it may be
cynical. What is clear is that nowhere in the lengthy corpus of "right to refuse treatment" litigation is this position ever seriously raised. 77 Its use here appears, again,
to reflect the sanist use of "social science."

C. The Criminal Trial Process
Courts tend to be even more sanist in their decisions in mental disability cases
that arise in the criminal contexts than in civil cases. 78 Thus, the sanist use of
social science in criminal cases involving the mentally ill is even more teleological
than in civil matters. This selectivity is exemplified in cases involving issues such
as incompetency to stand trial, insanity determinations, and post-insanity acquittal
commitment and release hearings.

"Id. at 1817 (Kennedy,J., concurring) .
73
Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Trial testimony had indicated that Riggins' daily drug regimen
(800 mgs. of Mellaril) was enough to "tranquilize an elephant." Id. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring),
quoting trial record.
'
74
Id. at 1823-24 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1825-26. At his trial, Riggins had been sentenced to death.
76
Id. at 1826.
77
The only case in which a similar issue is raised is Matter of Salisbury, 524 N.Y.S. 2d 352, 354 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988), holding that prior court authorization was not necessary before a state mental hospital
could administer antibiotics to a patient, citing " overwhelming public policy considerations" that made
it "imperative" that hospitals could perform such "routine, accepted, non-major medical treatment which
poses no significant risk, discomfort, or trauma to the patient." Salisbury has never been cited in any
subsequent case nor has it been mentioned in the law review literature.
78
See Perlin, supra note 9, at 402-03 (criminal trial process "riddled with sanist myths and stereotypes");
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 95-103 (discussing sanism in the incompetency to stand trial
process).
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1. Incompetency to Stand Trial (1ST) Determinations79
Courts often discourage and are hostile to pleas of incompetency based on a fear
that defendants are feigning 80 in an attempt to ultimately avoid criminal responsibi81
lity. This may explain why the states have been so remarkably laggard in implementing the 1972 decision in Jackson v. lndiana 82 in which the Supreme Court
ruled that IST defendants could not be maintained in maximum security indefinitely
if it we.re not substantially probable that they would gain their competency to stand
trial within the "foreseeable future. " 83
Mentally disabled defendants are also often forcibly medicated so as to be "made
competent" to stand trial, in spite of the possibility that the medications in question
might cause severe side-effects and, in specific cases, a lack of evidence that the
medication in question will actually serve to meet the expected end. Thus, in United
States v. Charters, 84 the Fourth Circuit held that the "substantial professional judgment" standard85 sufficiently protected defendant's liberty interests in seeking to
refuse forced medication. 86 Although the court briefly acknowledged the possibility
of side-effects, it quickly dismissed the magnitude of their potential harm by noting
that they were simply "one element" to be weighed in a best-interests decision. 87
Here the court conceded that it did not do an "exhaustive analysis" of the conflicting
scientific literature before it, demurring to the literature's importance:
It suffices to observe that, while there is universal agreement in the professional discipline that side-effects always exist as a risk, there is wide disagreement within those disciplines as to the degree of their severity. 88
In the course of its decision, the court revealed its "apprehensiveness about dealing
With underlying social, psychodynamic, and political issues that form the overt and
79

See generally Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 48-53, 68-73, 95-103; ~erlin, supra note 5.
See Stephen Golding et al, Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to Stand Trial: Preliminary
Data on the Interdisciplinary Fitness Review, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321 (1984); Richard Rogers, J. Roy
Gillis & R. Michael Bagby, The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: Cross Validation of a Correctional
Sample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85 (1990). The best recent evidence suggests that feigning is statistically
rare, and usually identifiable. See, e.g., David Schretlen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery
to Detect Prison Inmates Who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 75 (I 990) (92-95%
of all subjects correctly classified as either faking or non-faking); Dewey Cornell & Gary Hawk, Clinical
Presentation of Malingerers Diagnosed by Experienced Forensic Psychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375,
80

~81-83 (1989) (feigning attempted in fewer than 8% of cases studied).
See, e.g., State v. Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992); State v. Sharkey, 821 S.W.2d 544, 546
(Mo. App. 1991); Blacklock v. State, 820 S.W. 2d 882, 884--85 (Tex. App. 1991), petit. for discret.
~ev. filed (1992); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724,727 (Utah App. 1991). For the most recent example
in a Supreme Court opinion in a case involving an insanity acquittee, see Foucha v. Louisiana, 112
~- Ct. 1780 (1992), at 1796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and at 1802 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
83
Id. at 738. Thirteen years after Jackson was decided, it remained not implemented in almost half
the states. See Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 921, 940
tl985) .
., 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
86 See Youngbergv.·Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
87 Charters, 863 F.2d at 307-08.
Id. at 310.
88
Id. at 311. While this is certainly true, this does not excuse the court from refusing to critically analyze
te scientific research in corning to its ultimate decision. See Perlin, supra note 5, at 990--92; compare
_onahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 582-83 (setting out steps to be used by courts in analyzing social
science evidence) .
•
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hidden agendas in any right-to-refuse case," 89 a problem especially pointed where
the right-to-refuse question arises in a criminal context. The court's decision further
incorporated a broad array of heuristic devices in a way that led to the trivialization
and misuse of the social science data before it.90

2. Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGR/) Determinations91
In the past decade, the impact of the Hinckley acquittal has increasingly led to
attacks on the insanity defense by legislators, prosecutors, the courts, and members
of the general public. 92 The caselaw reflects incessant judicial disparagement of
the plea, of expert testimony in support of defendants asserting the plea, and of
social science data that could help illuminate the "myths" that have grown up about
the insanity defense. 93
Distrust of and selective use of social science data also surfaces in cases involving
the recommitment of insanity acquittees. As a result of the use of distorted heuristic
cognitive devices, 94 ego defenses, 95 and sociopolitical pressure, 96 courts are particuhirly sanist and teleological in their consideration of social science research in
these cases. 97
More recently, Justice Thomas's recent opinion in Foucha v. Louisiana98 is a
textbook case of sanist behavior in a social science setting. Dissenting from a decision
holding that retention of non-mentally ill insanity acquittees in a forensic mental

89

Perlin, supra note 5, at 966.
Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 73- 74.
91
S ee generally Perlin, supra note 1; Perlin, supra note 6:
92
Perlin, supra note 1, at 609- 23.
93
United States v. Lyons, 731 F .2d 243, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1984):
A majority of psychiatrists now believe that "they do not possess sufficient accurate scientific bases
for measuring a person's capacity for self-control or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity
... In addition, the risks of fabrication and "moral mistakes" in administering the insanity defense
are greatest when the experts and the jury are asked whether the defendant has the capacity to " control"
himself or whether he could have " resisted" the criminal impulse.
Compare id., 739 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) .
94
Perlin, supra note 6, at 12-22.
9
' D. Dorfman, supra note 14.
96
S ee, e.g., Final Report of the National Institute of M ental Health Ad Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12
MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L. RPTR. 77, 96 ( 1988) (in the aftermath of the Hinckley acquittal, federal government
could be counted on, " in controversial cases .. . to oppose any conditional release recommendation")
(emphasis added) . See also Francois v. Henderson, 850 F. 2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 198) (testifying doctor
conceded he may have "hedged" in earlier testimony as to whether or not insanity acquittee could
be released, "because he did not want to be criticized should [the defendant] be released and then
commit a criminal act") .
.
97
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), approving a post-commitment insanity acquittal
recommitment scheme that placed the burden on the patient to prove he was no longer mentally ill
or dangerous, and concluding that it was reasonable to presume that defendant's mental illness continued:
"Someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act [at some point
in the past] is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment." Id. at 366. No social science data base
supports this assumption; the decision in Jones is utterly indeterminate, and reflects simply the court's
"unwillingness to contradict public sentiment [soon after the Hinckley acquittal] in such a controversial
area. " See Louise Dovre, Note, Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of Individuals Found Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 68 MINN. L. REV. 822, 840 (1984) .
98
112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) .
90
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hospital violated the due process clause, 99 Thomas based his conclusion that such
retention was permissible on a variety of sources, including the 1962 commentary
to the Model Penal Code, a 1933 text by Henry Weihofen, and a 1956 Supreme
Coun case that had stressed psychiatry's "uncenainty of diagnosis." 100 He focused
at some length on the possibility of "calculated abuse of the insanity defense" by
defendants who might feign the plea, and speculated as to ·how the public might
react to the specter of a "serial killer ... returned to the streets immediately after
trial. .. 101
Thomas's opinion is astounding for several reasons. First, he relies on legal scholarship that precedes (by 10-40 years) the Coun's application of the due process clause
to cases involving the institutionalization of mentally disabled criminal defendants. 102
Second, he relies on a mid-1950's characterization of psychiatric precision in diagnosis to suggest that psychiatry is so inexact that the court should discount expert
testimony saying that an individual once acquitted on grounds of insanity is not
mentally ill; yet-no doubt because it fits well with his a priori position on the
case-he finds that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are sufficiently reliable
to require the acquittee's future institutionalization (although, here, the experts
hedged on even this prediction). 103
Third, Justice Thomas's twin foci on the sanist judges' worst fears about insanity
acquittees-that they "faked" the insanity defense in the first place and that the
improper use of the defense will allow for the speedy release of serial killers-is
a Profound demonstration of how sanist judges distort social science evidence. The
empirical data is clear-beyond doubt-that the insanity defense is rarely feigned,
that such attempts are invariably "seen through" by fact finders, and that "successful" acquittees are generally institutionalized in maximum security facilities for far
longer periods of time than they would have been incarcerated in penal facilities
had they been convicted of the predicate crimes. 104 His reference to "serial killers"
is even more perplexing here, given the fact that Foucha's underlying charges were
burglary and firearms offenses.
99

Foucha had been found NGRI of burglary and weapons charges. After he spent four years in a forensic
hospital, that facility's superintendent recommended that he be released since he "evidenced no signs
of Psychosis and neurosis" and was in "good shape mentally," notwithstanding a diagnosis of antisocial
Personality disorder. Id. at 1782. The court below had found that, because Foucha remained dangerous,
.
.
: coul~ be retained in the facility. Id. ~t 1783. Th~ Supreme Court re~~ed;, •
See id. at 1797 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (refemng to "current proV1s1ons of the Amencan Law lnsutute's Model Penal Code); id. at 1801 (citing Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956),
for Proposition that there is "uncertainty of diagnosis" in psychiatry); id. at 1806 (citing, inter alia,
liENRv WEIFHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 294-332 (1933), for proposition that
there is a long history of states providing for the continued institutionalization of dangerous insanity
acquittees). Cf. Focha at 1787 n.6 (majority opinion) (charging that sections in question "fail to incorporate
~~ reflect substantial developments in the relevant decisional law during the intervening three decades").
Id. at 1801--02.
102
103 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) .
See Mary Durham & John Q. LaFond, "Responsibility or Therapy in ~ontrolling the Mentally Ill:
'Ib.e Relationship Between the Insanity Defense and Involuntary Commitment," (paper presented at
the annual Law & Society Meeting, May 1992), manuscript at 13: "Neoconservative law reform values
ps}'chiatric expertise only when it enhances the social control function of the law and denigrates it when
does not."
See Perlin, supra note 1, at 646-55 (citing empirical studies and sources). A similar "fear of feigning"
~a~ als~ have been the motivating force behind J~sti~e O'Conn~r's recent concurrence in Medina v.
. aliforrua, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (not •unconsutuuonal to assign burden of proof to defendant in
lllcompetency to stand trial proceeding), discussed in 3 PERLIN, supra note 17, §14.05A (1992 pocket
Pan).
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D. Conclusion
Jurisprudential developments in this area still predominantly reflect sanist thinking.
Although the majority opinions in Riggins and Foucha are written in nonsanist tones
and demonstrate a capacity to integrate social science into mental disability law
decisionmaking, courts still regularly employ heuristic cognitive devices and selfreferential "common sense" in their selective use (and nonuse) of social science,
leading to both sanist and pretextual outcomes. It is imperative that scholars,
researchers and participants in the justice system confront this reality.

V. NEED FOR CONFRONTATION
A. Introduction
Until we articulate the roots of the legal system's sanist biases and pretextual decisionmaking mechanisms and subsequently demonstrate how these biases infect the legal
system's "read" of social science data, we will not make any significant headway
in creating a coherent framework for the consideration of social science data in
mental disability law cases. A review of the caselaw reflects several specific overarching
incoherences and dissonances that dominate this area of jurisprudence.
In a wide variety of jurisprudential cont~xts-competency determinations, civil
commitments hearings, trials involving mentally disabled criminal defendantssocial science is used (or not used) teleologically. 105 When a court wishes to avoid
confronting the empirical reality known to· all behavioralists that competency is a
fluid state and that one can be competent for some purposes and not for others, 106
it sticks its head in the legal sand and says, basically, "This is too much for us
to try to figure out." 107 When a fact-finder "knows" (because it comports with
the judge's own self-referential/aux common sense) that a rejection of a civil commitment application will exacerbate urban homelessness, he simply says that it will,
without reference to any of the extensive sociological and behavioral data base that
has carefully weighed this question. 108
Other examples abound. 109 To some extent, the principle of "cognitive dissonance"-the tendency of individuals to reinterpret information or experience that
conflicts with their intemaliy accepted or publicly stated beliefs in order to avoid
the inconsistent state that much inconsistencies producel1°-may be operative here.
Judges wish to avoid overt consideration of social science data that "conflicts with

10
' See Tanford, supra note 7, at 151 (discussing critiques of social science as a decisionmaking tool
that mas.ks the true political and ideological bases of judicial decisions).
106
See, e.g., sources cited in Perlin, supra note 21, manuscript at 85-87 nn.204-47 .
101
See, e.g., Monahan &Walker, supra note 8, at 511 n.119.
108
See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 21, manuscript at 107--08 (discussing decision in In re Melton, discussed
supra text accompanying notes 53-53; compare sources cited in Perlin, supra note 20, at 94-108.
109
·
See, e.g. , sources cited in Perlin, supra note 4, manuscript at 87-91 (on the relationship between
a patient's likelihood to self-medicate in the community and an involuntary civil commitment finding);
David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L. J. 595, 628-32 (1983).
11 0
See Perlin, supra note 24, at 139; Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 46-51 & n .103 (1991). See generally LEON FESTINGER,
A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ( 1957); ROBERT WICKLUND & JACK BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNI·
TIVE DISSONANCE (1976) .
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their internally accepted or publicly stated beliefs;" the result is a retreat to the
use of sanist myths and pretextual decisions.
In this way, courts allow themselves to avoid the confrontation of the hard value
choices that underlie many of the cases in question. This contributes further to
the antitherapeutic quality of mental disability jurisprudence. At a time when scholars
?ave begun to develop and refine the concept of "therapeutic jurisprudence," it
is especially important that we consider its relationship to sanist case law and pretextual decisionmaking.

B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
111
"Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as a therapeutic agent.
This perspective recognizes that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers'
roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questions
Whether such rules, procedures and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance
their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles. 112
Although an impressive body of literature has been produced, 113 there has not
Yet been a systematic investigation into the reasons why some courts decide cases
."therapeutically' and others "anti-therapeutically." 114 Our preliminary conclusion
is that sanism is such a dominant psychological force that it (1) distorts "rational"
decisionmaking, (2) encourages (albeit on at least a partially-unconscious level)
Pretextuality and teleology, and (3) prevents decisionmakers from intelligently and
~oherently focusing on questions that are meaningful to therapeutic jurisprudential
inquiries. 115
The types of sanist decisions that we have just discussed operate in an ostensibly
atherapeutic world; although some decisions are, in fact, therapeutic and others
are, in fact, antitherapeutic, these outcomes seem to arise almost in spite of themselves.116 In short, we cannot make any_lasting progress in "putting mental health
111

J

,

See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15; ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
9; ~exler, Putting, supra note 15; David Wexler & Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal
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into mental health law" 117 until we confront the system's sanist biases and the ways
that these sanist biases blunt our ability to intelligently weigh and assess social science
data in the creation of a mental disability law jurisprudence.

C. Some Prescriptions for Future Behavior
First, it is essential that the issues discussed in this paper be added to the research
agendas of social scientists, behaviorists and legal scholars. 118 Researchers must carefully examine case law and statutes to determine the extent to which social science
is being teleologically used for sanist ends. They must also study the way that judges
treat litigants who are perceived to be mentally disabled and how such litigants
respond to that judicial treatment. 119 They must also study empirical inquiries into
the extent of mentally disabled persons' knowledge about either their legal rights
or their medication regimens. 120 These inquiries will help illuminate the ultimate
impact of sanism on this area of the law, aid lawmakers and other policymakers
in understanding the ways that social science data is manipulated to serve sanist
ends, and assist in the formulation of both normative and instrumental strategies
that can be used to rebut sanism in the legal system.
Second, lawyers representing mentally disabled individuals must familiarize themselves with this data. The track record of lawyers representing the mentally disabled
has ranged from indifferent to wretched; 121 in one famous survey, lawyers were
so bad that a patient had a better chance of being released at a commitment hearing
ifhe appeared prose. 1.22 Further, simply educating lawyers about psychiatric technique
and psychological nomenclature does not materially improve lawyers' performance
where underlying attitudes are not changed. 123 If counsel is to become even minimally

117

See Wexler, Putting, supra note 15.
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119
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rights explained to them upon admission to hospital) (patients institutionalized in large, urban, universityaffiliated hospital); Cathryn Clary et al., Psychiatric Inpatients' Knowledge ofMedication at Hospital Discharge,
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competent in this area, it is critical that the underlying issues here be confronted. 124
:his is underscored by judges' lack of basic. knowledge about mental disability law;
10
one astonishing case, a Louisiana civil commitment order was reversed where
th . 1
e tna court did not even know of the existence of a state-mandated Mental Health
Advocacy service.12s
M Third, system decisionmakers should study the steps recently outlined by John
onahan _a nd Laurens Walker for courts to adhere to when addressing questions
concerning human behavior. 126 They should then assess the potential impact on
developments in mental disability law if these steps were to be followed, as well
as ~~ extent to which adherence to these proposals could minimize teleological
?ecisionmaking. If courts genuinely did follow these recommendations-and, for
instance, began to "evaluate . . . available research by determining whether the
research has survived the critical review of the scientific community, has used valid
res
h
·
~arc methods, ... and is supported by a body of related research" 127-the "rea~oning" in decisions such as Barefoot, Jones, and Parham is certainly less likely to
e r~peated in future litigation.
h Finally, system decisionmakers must regularly engage in a series of "sanism
c eeks" to insure-to the greatest extent possible-a continuing conscious and selfreflective evaluation of their decisions to best avoid sanism's pernicious power. We
n_eed to take what we learn from therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behaVJ.or and pretextual reasoning and provide real lawyers at real hearings (at which
real inquiries are made as to mental status, need for commitment, availability of
eat_ment and restrictivity of institutionalization) for mentally disabled individuals .
. f this Were to be done, the pretextual use of social science data could be confronted
inan open and meaningful way.·

f

D. Conclusion
Sanist thinking dominates legal disc~urse and infects legal aecisionmaking. To
accommodate sanist influences, judges frequently decide mental disability cases pretextually. In doing this, they read social science data teleologically so as to confirm
Pre-held beliefs but so as to avoid the cognitive dissonance or psychological reactance
~at Would be caused if they were forced to confront data or evidence that conflicted
With their faux OCS. All of this generally operates on an unconscious level.
M~ntal disability is no longer-if it ever was-an obscure subspeciality of legal
Pra:tice and study. Each of its multiple strands forces us to make hard social policy
~hoices about troubling social issues-psychiatry and social control, the use of institutions
·
h.ip b etween pu bl.ic percep. ' i·nt,ormed consent, personal autonomy, the re1anons
!:n a_nd_ social reality, the many levels of "co_m ~etency," the ~ole of free will in
h cnminal law system, the limits of confidentiality, the protection duty of mental
ealth Professionals, the role of power in forensic evaluations. These are all difficult
~~
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inact a rare Judicial acknowledgement of the impact of lawyer mcompetency m another area where
19 9 t)quate c_o~sel leads to morally intolerable result~, se~ Engber~,v. Meyer, 8,20. P.2d 70, 1, 04_(Wyo.
de
· (Urb1gkit, C. J., dissenting in part & concumng m part) ( We ... let chiropractors with law
di:eUtip~rf?nn the equivalent of brain surgery in capital cases, and, predictably, the 'patient' often
'" In ~ s is intolerable."),
"' S ~-P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. App. 1987).
'" ldee 0 nahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 582-84.
• at 583.
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and complex questions that are not susceptible to easy, formulistic answers. When
sanist thinking distorts the judicial process, the resulting doctrinal incoherence should
not be a surprise.
David Wexler, Bruce Winick and others have embarked upon an important and
exciting enterprise in the study of therapeutic jurisprudence. This, though, is just
one step toward the reconstruction of mental disability law. We must also-simultaneously-confront the law's sanist roots and pretextual biases in all policy arenas:
the courtroom, the legislature, the practicing bar, the academy. Only then, will
an understanding of mental disability law jurisprudence, truly, begin.

